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Volunteering Children for 
Medical Experiments 
Albert Dilanni, S.M. 
Father Dilanni is vicar general of the Marist Fathers in Rome. He 
received his doctorate from the University of Louvain. Belgium. has 
taught moral philosophy and medical ethics. and has published widely. 
A subject which has aroused considerable interest on the part of 
moralists is the legitimacy of proxy-consent by parents or guardians in 
non-therapeutic experimentation on children. By "non-therapeutic" is 
meant experimentation aimed at benefitting not the child itself, but other 
children.' Two major positions have crystallized. These positions are I) an 
absolutist one forbidding proxy-consent for non-therapeutic experiments 
on children in all cases (Ramsey, May), and 2) a moderate position 
allowing such consent on two conditions: if there is no discernible risk to 
the health of the child, and if there present at the same time the hope of 
significant benefit to others (McCormick, Curran, O'Donnell). I am in 
sympathy with the conclusion of the second group but do not agree with 
the arguments they adduce to support it. The argument offered by its 
principal exponent, Richard McCormick, seems especially questionable 
and will be treated extensively below. 
1. Abortion and the Ethics of Medical Experimentation 
The Supreme Court's 1973 decision liberalizing abortion has 
complicated questions of medical experimentation. Some doctors have 
interpreted it as implicitly sanctioning a wide range of research on 
abortuses or on fetuses destined for abortion. The argument runs: "If you 
are allowed in a certain instance to kill a fetus (by aborting it), then a 
fortiori are you allowed to perform upon it less damaging experiments in 
view of potential benefit to others?" Among the experiments which these 
doctors would avoid in the abortion situation are those which would tend 
to keep the fetus alive, since that would be contrary to the wishes of the 
parent(s). They only type of experiment allowed would be one which 
would benefit not the subject of the experiment but only others. 
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According to Paul Ramsey this skews longstanding principles of 
medical ethics regulating experimentation.2 These principles have always 
required the experimenter to procure explicit and informed consent from a 
patient prior to engaging in a well-designed medical experiment upon that 
patient. Only when the state of the patient renders this impossible might 
one proceed to act upon a validly presumed consent. However, such 
presumed consent was restricted to those cases in which the experiment 
was the last therapeutic hope for the patient himself. The classical instance 
is called the "Good Samaritan" case. Here, since coma or other factors 
preclude explicit consent, a doctor may legitimately presume that the 
subject would consent to treatment indicated for his own benefit and 
would thus agree to experimental medicine if all other means were deemed 
futile. 
Allowing non-therapeutic fetal experiments on those about to be 
aborted , while forbidding therapeutic experiments on them, transposes 
the traditional principles of experimentation. It legitimizes experimenta-
tion on an individual for the benefit of others and forbids it in the only 
cases where traditionally it was most clearly allowed , i.e., when the 
experiment is aimed at the benefit of the subject him/ herself. We must take 
care that this skewed logic as regards fetuses marked for abortion does not 
also generate a lax attitude in experiments on children who, like fetuses, 
have not fully developed their essential human potential. 
2. Experimentation on Children: Different Opinions 
In this paper, we will set aside the abortion question and concentrate on 
the moral principles which should govern experimental research on very 
young children who are considered by the vast majority to be persons 
morally and legally.3 
Since such children are incapable of formal consent, questions arise 
concerning whether and when parents may give proxy-consent for medical 
experiments to be performed upon them. Paul Ramsey hews to a strict 
line: proxy-consent is legitimate only when the experiment is the last hope 
for the child's own recovery.4 It is permissible, in other words, only when 
the child itself is ill and the experiment clearly provides the last possible 
hope of cure for the child-subject of the experiment. Ramsey qualifies this 
rule by allowing experiments upon a child, even though it is not itself ill, if 
it lives in an area in which an infectious children's disease actually rages as 
an epidemic. He cites the first inoculations of children with the Salk 
vaccine as a legitimate "exception" to the general rule. Even though there 
was a small risk that the vaccine itself might cause polio, in those years all 
children were at risk each summer from the raging poliomyelitis epidemic. 
Ramsey deems that the presence of this danger was sufficient to allow one 
to construe such experimental inoculations as "therapeutic" in a wide 
sense. 
The Guidelines for Clinical Investigation adopted by the American 
Medical Association in 1966, took a broader view of the legitimacy of 
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parental proxy-consent and allowed it in some cases of non-therapeutic 
experiment. They set forth two conditions, both of which must be fulfilled 
together before a construction of presumed consent in the child could be 
permitted. Such experimentation is sanctioned I) "only if the nature of the 
investigation is such that mentally competent adults would not be suitable 
subjects" and 2) only "under circumstances in which an informed and 
prudent adult would reasonably be expected to volunteer himself or his 
child as a subject". The first condition envisages experiments necessary for 
research on the mentally retarded or in the case of diseases which do not 
primarily affect adults, but children. The second condition restricts non-
therapeutic experiments to those cases wherein the risks foreseen are 
minimal or negligible. The first condition is rather objective and follows 
the indications of medical science. The second begets the further question 
of how to determine what would reasonably move an adult to volunteer 
himself or his / her child. 
Ramsey claims that the AMA criteria beg a more basic question: 
whether one can ever proceed to presume consent in the case of young 
children. He argues that to presume the consent of a child is to treat the 
child not as a child but as an adult. The presumption is necessarily "false" 
since the child in fact does not have, nor ever had, an actual or habitual 
capacity to give or hold back consent.5 William May agrees with Ramsey 
and adds that the legitimacy of therapeutic experimentation on children is 
grounded not on a presumption of the child's consent, but on the parents' 
duty in charity to care for their children.6 
Ramsey continues that even if we grant, for the sake of argument, that 
proxy-consent be allowed in the case of children, it must be interpreted 
with utter strictness. This derives from the analogy with adults. Few adults 
would agree to the proposition that if they were unconscious they could 
become the subject of experiments for the benefit of others, even when 
such experiments entailed no discernible risk, but involved only "offensive 
touchings". (Examples ofthese are taking a blood sample or performing a 
small transfusion.) Why then, argues Ramsey, would one deem it 
legitimate to volunteer our children in similar instances? The issue of 
non-therapeutic experimentation on children is prismatic, Ramsey 
continues, for it tests the seriousness with which we view the consent 
requirement in general. 
I respect the care and reverence of the Ramsey-May approach, but I 
believe that paradoxically it may be at once overly cautious and potentially 
dangerous. In the first place Ramsey's position denying the possibility of 
any presumption of consent on the part of a child establishes too strong a 
distinction between children and ad ults, a difference which will come back 
to haunt the conservative moralist in the abortion issue and in questions 
regarding defective newborns. It is morally safer and closer to the truth to 
construe both children and fetuses as full-fledged humans on the grounds 
that they share the same essential potentialities. As such .they can be 
presumed also to share the same basic desires as adult humans. The fact 
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that they are not as yet subjects of actual or habitual choice does not seem 
relevant. If, because of these esssential potencies, they share the same 
rights as adults in the medical situation, then why not the same 
responsibilities in relevantly similar cases? 
Moreover, May's attempt to derive our moral obligation to give consent 
for therapeutic experiments for the benefit of the child from the duty of 
charity incumbent upon parents seems, in itself, to demand a construction 
of the child's desires by way of analogy with the desires of adults. We 
usually decide the demands of charity by asking ourselves what we would 
desire others to do for us in the same situation. It is done by consulting our 
own ordinary desires. In deciding whether it is an act of love to let a badly 
malformed infant die in certain circumstances, we imagine ourselves in the 
child's place and ask what we ourselves would want others to do for us. 
And this is to construct consent in the child. 
Other Catholic moralists agree with Ramsey in insisting on explicit 
informed consent from a competent adult patient in the case of non-
therapeutic experimental research. But in such cases some would allow the 
next of kin to give proxy-consent on behalf of an incompetent adult or 
child if such experiment involved only minimal risk or minor discomfort to 
the patient (McCormick, Curran, O'Donnell). McCormick is the principal 
exponent of this view and I will analyze his arguments as representative.7 
3. Analysis and Critique of McCormick's Position 
He begins by noting that as years passed, the strictness of the 
Nuremburg Code has gradually been moderated. This code demanded 
that the explicit consent of the subject was absolutely necessary and went 
on to underline that this meant that "the person involved should have a 
legal capacity to give consent".8 As evidence of a relaxation he cites the 
1966 AMA guidelines and the 1973 HEW document entitled Protection of 
Human Subjects: Policies and Procedures. 9 The latter forbids non-
therapeutic experiments which are risky, but approves of non-therapeutic 
experiments on the basis of proxy-consent when there is "little risk and 
where the potential benefit is clear". It further specifies that the 
information to be gained must be unobtainable in other ways and that the 
potential benefit to mankind must be significant and far outweigh the risk. 
McCormick agrees with the practical conclusions of these studies and 
himself allows proxy-consent where there is no discernible risk or undue 
discomfort in a non-therapeutic experiment. 1O He defends these 
conclusions in two steps. He first analyzes the moral meaning of proxy-
consent in the therapeutic situation where all agree that it is allowed. He 
then applies the principles derived from this analysis to experimentation 
on the child in the non-therapeutic situation. Though I can readily agree 
with his conclusions, I cannot subscribe to the reasons he advances in their 
defense. And I believe that this disagreement is important because often in 
ethics, reasons for conclusions are more interesting than conclusions 
themselves, for if they are unsound they may, through logical extension, 
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contaminate even other areas of moral consideration. 
McCormick argues that the reason why we can legitimately presume 
that an adult would decide in favor of experimentation which will be 
potentially therapeutic for himself is because he ought morally to do so. In 
other words, from the accepted proposition that one ought morally to try 
to save one's own life in most situations, we can conclude to the 
proposition that a person would want to do so in those same situations. 
McCormick then applies this thought to the non-therapeutic instance. 
He says that if we can discern that an incompetent adult or child ought 
morally to allow a non-therapeutic experiment to be performed on 
him j herself when there is no discernible risk, then we can presume that 
that person would want to consent to such an experiment. 
Against Ramsey's contention that to impute moral obligation upon the 
child is to falsely imply that it is a moral agent, McCormick replies that the 
use of ought-language need not be construed as implying either actual 
moral obligations or agency. I I It is simply a device or construction used to 
ascertain the reasonableness of our expectations and intentions. To apply 
such ought-language, he claims, is simply a way of pointing to the sociality 
inherent in all humans, a sociality shared by adults and children alike. If we 
say of an adult that he ought morally to supply certain benefits for others 
when this involves no discernible risk, we are not implicitly saying that 
they are moral agents possessing free will, but simply implying that they 
are social beings and that the quality of sociality bears certain moral 
responsibilities. Though a child does not share agency and free will, it does 
share this essential sociality. It may not be able to consciously experience 
this sociality or respond to its claims but we may do so for him, to the 
extent that it is reasonable. 
Here I believe that McCormick is correct: the ought language as used in 
his argument need not be read as treating the child as an adult who has 
actual desires and freedom to choose. However, even though McCormick's 
argument does not offend from that point of view, I will argue that his 
approach of determining what a person wants by first establishing oughts, 
and on the basis of this presuming consent, is untenable in general, 
whether it be applied to adults or to children. 
McCormick's argument can be schematized as follows: 
- What A ought morally to do, A would (ceteris paribus) want to do. 
-But A ought morally to do x. 
-Therefore, A would (ceteris paribus), want to do x. 
It is clear from his discussion that in speaking of wants in the first 
premises, McCormick is interpreting them to mean inclinations inherent 
in the essence of man as a social being. With Aquinas and other naturalla w 
theorists, he views these deep-seated wants (inclinations) as the ground of 
certain values, which values in turn ground certain moral "oughts".12 
These moral oughts are prescriptive re-writings ofthese deep-seated wants 
or inclinations; they are simply these wants presented in another form. 
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Natural law theory defends the existence of certain imperatives which all 
humans ought to embrace, because these imperatives are ultimately 
definitive of their own well-being, because they express in different words 
what each human being at the deepest level of his essence really desires. 
Moral oughts give voice to what humans most deeply want. 
For McCormick, the reason why we can proceed to presume the consent 
of incompetent adults or children to be experimented on in therapeutic 
situations is because we know that they ought to choose to have well-
designed experiments to be performed on them when these are the last 
hope for saving their life. We can know what they would want in such 
instances because we know that there is a strong moral imperative or 
"ought" for all humans to try to preserve their life . Similarly, one can 
presume that an incompetent adult or child would consent even to non-
therapeutic experimentation when this does not entail a discernible risk or 
undue discomfort and at the same time affords significant benefit to 
others . Being a possessor of a social nature, this is what he / she ought to do, 
therefore it can be presumed that he / she would also want to do it. 
This reasoning is not only unnecessarily complicated but, to my mind, 
also fallacious. For McCormick's syllogism, if I have correctly construed 
it, appears to equivocate. It uses the word "want" in two different senses: to 
refer to essential inclinations in one mention (first premise) and to actual 
desires, or the presumption of such in the second mention (conclusion) . 
But it is clear that these are two different realities or concepts, as we will 
show. The argument trades on the verbal similarity which exists between 
deep-seated wants and actual wants or willings and, as a result, commits 
what in logic is called the "fallacy offour terms". It tries invalidly to ded uce 
the presumption of an actual willing from a proposition announcing the 
presence of essential wants or inclinations which are revealed by a moral 
ought. 
But the ded uction of actual willings, or of the presumption thereof, from 
our essential inclinations, is contrary to our moral experience and offends 
our comon moral understanding. Can one really determine what one 
would actually want in a situation from a perception of what one ought to 
do? Is it not as often the case that people do not desire to do what they 
ought? In other words, do not the actual desires of people or their decisions 
often conflict with what they are essentially inclined to, with their deepest 
wants? Is this not the very meaning of sinfulness? To point to a deep-seated 
want which all humans share is not, by the same token, to ascertain that 
this is what individual humans would actually want. Actual willings are 
often in disharmony with deep-seated wants. 13 
4. Presentation and Defense of the Present Author's Position 
It seems to me that if we can presume consent on the part of a child for 
an experiment benefitting himself, as all seem to allow, it is on much 
simpler grounds than McCormick's considerations of essential inclina-
tions and oughts . It is because self-preservation, statistically speaking, is 
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what the great majority of people desire most of the time. And it is this 
empirically verifiable behavioral constant which provides a simple and 
legitimate basis for a prediction offuture activity and for a construction of 
a presumption of consent. 
The same can be said for the case of the non-therapeutic experiment. It is 
a fact open to observation that most people act altruistically when an 
action seems important for the benefit of others and it involves minimal 
risk or discomfort to oneself. It is because empirical observation reveals 
the presence of this minimum of altruism in people of most ages and 
cultures that we can presume that an unconscious adult would, if 
conscious, decide, ceteris paribus, to undergo a mild experiment which 
gives promise of substantial benefit to his fellow humans. The same form 
of reasoning can be applied to the child in similar circumstances. The child 
is, after all, a human being and it can be presumed that it will have the same 
desires as other humans in terms of self-preservation and altruism. In sum, 
we know that people would want to act out of altruism to this minimal 
extent, not because we know that they morally ought to do so, but because 
by experience we know that they do constantly so act. 
The attempt to move from moral oughts to what one would want tries to 
shed light upon a murky area from a source which is even murkier. Moral 
obligations are notoriously unclear, highly debated , and themselves call 
for justification. On the other hand, actual performances of people and a 
reading of their usual preferences is a much more straightforward and 
accessible matter. 
We must keep in mind , too, Marx's lesson that the morality of a society 
tends to mirror the interests of the power elite . In our society, it is clear 
from the moral acceptance of feticide that the ideal of pluralism upon 
which our country was founded has been narrowed to exclude the fetus 
and its presumed desires. The regnant morality of the adult population, 
which is clearly the power-elite in respect to children and the unborn, has 
already exploited the unborn for its own interests - interests which are, at 
times, admittedly quite important, but also for "interests on demand". In 
such a libertarian moral climate, it is dangerous to try to derive 
conclusions regarding the volunteering of children from so-called 
"objective" moral premises. It is far safer to ask the members of the power 
group to consult their own desires and ask how they themselves would 
actually like to be handled by society in various experimental situations 
and from this, to presume the same desire in children. 
My approach is safer because it reduces the legitimacy of experi-
mentation to cases in which the common run of people would actually be 
willing to volunteer themselves. It is the lowest common denominator 
approach which goes along with what the general run of people would 
allow. It thus avoids an escalation of the presumption upon children to the 
heroic or supererogatory. It avoids, too, McCormick's later propulsion of 
the obligation to volunteer for non-therapeutic experiments into the realm 
of social justice.14 To call it an obligation in justice seems excessive. This 
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can lead to an extrapolation of human sociality into higher and higher 
realms of obligation. The moral index of entering upon non-therapeutic 
experiment can, at most, be construed as a call upon one's altruism and 
charity. Consent for such experimentation can be presumed in children 
only to the extent to which such a degree of charity actually extends in the 
general population. The burden of the proof is with those who want to 
extend it further. 
One question remains. If we allow, with McCormick, that a child can be 
presumed to undergo non-therapeutic experiments when there is no 
discernible risk, what shall we count as the absence of such a risk? Are even 
so~called "offensive touchings", mentioned above, off-limits as Ramsey 
contends? (Ramsey allows only such insignificant interventions as a buccal 
smear, weighings and the like). I think the answer to this once again lies in a 
statistical study. Questionnaires can be developed to ascertain what sorts 
of interventions adults would be willing to allow done upon themselves if 
they were in the "child" situation. These same types of things can then be 
presumed to be wanted also by the child in relevantly similar situations. 
This may seem too individualistic an approach to McCormick, if I am to 
judge from some of his later remarks in response to criticisms by Ramsey.IS 
The question of the individual vs . society is always a delicate one in 
morality. It can not be decided in general and once and for all. One may 
have to shift emphasis from one side to the other of the scale depending on 
the subject matter at issue and the climate opinion in a culture. In the 
context presently under discussion, where we are dealing with defenseless 
and voiceless children, and in a climate which is utilitarian and anti-child 
as is our own, we would do best to lean toward favoring the individual. We 
are living in a technological society which has a bias toward the powerful, 
toward adults in full-fledged maturity, toward control, and toward the 
pre-eminence of conscious, experienced life. As Ralph Potter, the Harvard 
theologian, has insisted in speaking of abortion, the situation of our 
culture is such that we must take the safer path. We must not ask for whom 
the bell tolls. It tolls for all of us and for our children. 
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